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Abstract 
Traditional economic theory suggests that decision makers should not allow sunk costs to 
shape future actions. However, empirical studies have found a commensurate relationship 
between sunk costs and future expenditures even when expected marginal costs exceed expected 
marginal benefits, an idea referred to as the “escalation of commitment.” With large sunk costs 
annually incurred through player drafts, executives in the high-stakes business of professional 
sports may be particularly prone to this irrational behavior. This research specifically examines 
teams’ personnel decisions in the National Basketball Association (NBA) to determine the 
prevalence of escalation in the league. This study finds evidence of escalation that is lower in 
magnitude and shorter in duration than in previous studies. While a player’s draft position 
continued to affect his playing time, this effect was limited to the first two years. Furthermore, 
draft position among first round players played a minimal, if any, role in a team’s decision to 
retain a player. However, under the 1999 Collective Bargaining Agreement, being drafted in the 
first round significantly increased a player’s chances of retainment. No such effect was seen 
under the 2005 CBA. 
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I. Introduction 
Traditional economic theory suggests that decision makers should not allow sunk costs to 
shape future actions. To allow these costs to affect a decision is to commit the Sunk Cost 
Fallacy, an irrational action that empirically is quite common. From politics to managerial 
choices to everyday economic decisions, evidence of this fallacy can be found throughout many 
disciplines (Staw, 1997; Garland, Sandefur and Rogers, 1990). In fact even US Presidents have 
succumbed to this Fallacy. Both Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush openly justified 
military action through previously incurred monetary and human costs (Staw, 1997; Manier, 
2006). Examining this fallacy, studies have found a commensurate relationship between sunk 
costs and future expenditures in a failing project, an idea known as the “escalation of 
commitment” (Staw, 1976). 
In professional sports, labor choices are among the most important managerial decisions 
(Késenne, 2007). With large sunk costs incurred through annual player drafts, executives in the 
high-stakes business of professional sports may be particularly prone to the escalation of 
commitment. Under the goals of maximizing wins and profits, the rational action would be to 
play the most productive and lucrative players. However, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that this is not always the case. Every year disgruntled sports fans and expert 
commentators are perplexed by the various personnel decisions made by their favorite teams.  
 This research evaluates NBA teams’ personnel decisions to determine the prevalence of 
the escalation of commitment. In order to do so, the study considers the effects of draft position 
on playing time and likelihood to be retained. Since higher draft picks have higher salaries than 
those drafted behind them, higher picks incur larger sunk costs. With appropriate controls, if an 
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individual’s draft position predicts playing time or retainment, NBA teams may be guilty of 
escalation of commitment. 
The previous studies on this topic have not fully encompassed the recent theoretical 
literature, have not been updated through the past four Collective Bargaining Agreements 
(CBAs) and have not utilized the most accurate performance measures. Recent theoretical 
research has shown that there is often rational behavior behind what is ostensibly the escalation 
of commitment. This study is conducted in light of this new theory, and the models are updated 
to appropriately separate rational behavior from what is perceived as irrational decision making. 
Also, as the current research in the literature has examined data only through the 1991 draft, this 
analysis better explains the dynamics of the present-day NBA. Lastly, instead of using the simple 
performance measures in the previous studies, the models in this paper utilize advanced statistics 
such as John Hollinger’s Player Efficiency Rating and the Win Shares metric.  
In addition to multivariate analysis, this study also employs a logistic model. Though 
Staw and Hoang (1995) completed an event series analysis, a logistic model should allow 
assessments on a year-to-year basis while eliminating issues in the interpretation of a survival 
analysis. This study anticipates that a careful consideration of the newest theory, along with 
improved models and a vastly different NBA salary environment, will lead to finding less 
evidence of escalation of commitment than what has been seen in previous studies. In effect, this 
study anticipates finding more rational behavior among NBA decision makers. 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Theoretical Background 
The recognition of the Sunk Cost Fallacy and its relevance to decision-making is not a 
new phenomenon. Beginning with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), traditional utility theory was 
challenged in favor of Prospect Theory which sought to illustrate decision making under risk. To 
begin this discussion, consider traditional utility theory where       is the utility of outcome    
and    is the probability of its occurrence. The expected utility of a set of potential outcomes is 
calculated as follows: 
(1)                  ∑        
 
   . 
Furthermore, a prospect is added to an asset class, w, when 
 (2)      ∑        
 
        . 
This equation shows that a prospect is considered when its expected utility is a net benefit. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found in many experiments that individuals undervalue 
possible opportunities and overvalue guarantees. Furthermore, individuals were risk loving with 
sure losses and risk averse with definite gains. These empirical findings can be incorporated into 
a value function. In this function, utility is replaced by value,  , which is a change in wealth 
relative to an initial reference point. The likelihood of occurrence,     , denotes an empirically-
derived decision weight. This weight accounts for how an individual arrives at a sense of 
likelihood, rather than in utility theory where it is a subjective probability. Thus a prospect is 
evaluated as follows: 
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 (3)                  ∑           
 
   . 
Thaler (1980) outlined this value function over a gains and losses plane according to 
general premises backed by both economic and psychological principles. The value function is 
steeper over losses than it is over gains. This reflects the psychological principle that any given 
magnitude of value provides more aggravation when lost than it does pleasure when gained. 
Furthermore, the function is concave over gains and convex over losses to incorporate risk-
loving behavior with losses and risk-averseness with gains. This also implies that an identical 
difference between two values is perceived differently depending on their magnitude. For 
example, moving from 0 to 10 is greater value than from 500 to 510. This phenomenon has 
consistently been shown with experiments and even observed in large settings such as the US 
stock market (Weber and Camerer, 1997).  
In the context of this study, this may explain why teams are prone to the escalation of 
commitment with higher draft picks. Consider a recently drafted player who is described as 
            with   representing value in the losses plane. Thus a player has potential value of 
  and his salary and other costs are c. Only if his costs are greater than his gains is their “pain.” 
Consider a team that is indifferent to playing a “free” player, meaning             . Then, if 
a player incurs a salary, s, the value equation becomes        (      )  Because of risk-
loving behavior in the losses space,        (      )        . Therefore, a team 
otherwise indifferent to a player is induced to play him because of his incurred costs. Since 
higher picks have lower initial points on the losses plane, there potentially is a relationship 
between pick and playing time. Figure 1 shows the value function defined by Thaler (1980). 
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Figure 1: Value function as defined by Thaler (1980) 
As for empirical studies, Arkes and Blumer (1985) examined the Sunk Cost Fallacy 
through a series of psychological experiments that studied individuals’ decisions on events such 
as ski trips and movie theater showings. Overall they found that subjects were more likely to 
choose unsatisfying options with previously incurred costs over enjoyable alternatives with no 
incurred costs. Another experiment presented students with a managerial decision to invest in an 
incomplete project. In this study, they concluded a “greater tendency” to continue an endeavor 
once invested.  
Furthermore, Boehne and Paese (2000) conducted a comprehensive set of experiments 
that presented subjects with varying degrees of completion and a “sales price” of a completed 
project. Though they found that individuals acted more rational than they did in the previous 
studies, they confirmed a “completion effect” where the closer individuals were to completing a 
project the more likely they were to continue with an endeavor (p. 178). In the NBA, if a young 
player is the “project,” teams may believe higher picks are closer to “completion,” or their 
expected career performance levels which could lead to increased playing time.  
Re-evaluating the theoretical literature on sunk costs, McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon 
(2010) found that rational behavior often motivates the escalation of commitment. In their paper, 
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they presented three general rational aspects to help explain the escalation of commitment. First, 
as sunk costs are correlated with future costs, they can shape expectations of future costs and 
reveal informational content of a project. This means that the aforementioned “completion 
effect” observed in previous studies actually can be rational. 
To explain this, they present a simple two-period decision where    and    are the 
incurred costs and probability of completion in time period i. The completion cost,  ̅, is 
unknown and distributed according to a cumulative distribution function,    ̅   The cumulative 
hazard of investment is 
(4)              
              
       
. 
Therefore, because    depends on    it is rational to consider previously incurred costs when 
evaluating commitment in time period 2. Furthermore, with an increasing hazard rate in time 
period 1, the willingness to invest in time period 2 is positively related to sunk costs. 
Second, under asymmetrical information, a manager may rationally continue a project in 
order to conceal that it was a failure and thus prevent reputation damages. In the NBA, after 
drafting a player higher than the general consensus expected, a team may play or keep a player to 
prevent its decision to appear wrong or ill-advised. Therefore, a change of a team’s coach or 
general manager (GM), who are often teams’ primary labor decision makers, may negatively 
affect a draft pick’s playing time. This study incorporates this theory by introducing a dummy 
variable for a coach or team executive change. A player drafted high above his market value (i.e. 
higher than a third-party evaluation) may be played by a team to prevent from admitting it has 
made a mistake. In this sense, reputational “costs” manifest in decision makers’ stubbornness 
and unwillingness to admit that the pick was unjustified. 
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Third, financial and time constraints can determine an individual’s ability to undertake 
another project. As an individual’s previous costs affect the ability to undertake a second option, 
budget constraints can cause an individual to continue with a current project. Empirically, Tan 
and Yates (2002) found that the prospect of overspending a budget actually deters the escalation 
of commitment. However, they also found that budgets can eschew the likelihood of undergoing 
beneficial investment opportunities. In the NBA, recent CBAs have reduced teams’ 
commitments to high picks while rookie contracts have become a smaller part of teams’ overall 
payrolls (Hill and Jolly, 2012). However a team may play a rookie simply because it is the only 
available option given its budget constraints and the talent distribution in the league. 
B. Professional Sports Labor Market 
To fully evaluate the escalation of commitment, the study must consider and ultimately 
assume certain motives behind NBA decision making. Zimbalist (2003) asserts that NBA owners 
may not strictly obey a profit-maximizing philosophy on a year-to-year basis but rather seek to 
maximize global and long-term returns. Berri, Brook and Schmidt (2004) found that wins 
maximize ticket sales in the NBA, not star power. For the purpose of this study it is assumed 
teams are profit-maximizers that value wins as their primary revenue-generators. It has been 
noted that external factors such as player popularity could motivate teams to play certain players. 
Though Staw and Hoang (1995) considered that this may affect a player’s draft position and 
subsequent playing time, they assumed that any leftover popularity from college would soon 
dissipate and thus quickly become irrelevant to playing time decisions. Camerer and Weber 
(1998) recognized the potential effects of player popularity but were ultimately unable to find a 
metric that quantified a player’s popularity. Since then Berri, Schmidt and Brook (2004) found 
that player popularity does not necessarily lead to increased ticket revenue. Ultimately, though 
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individual popularity may cause increased revenue, this research maintains that a player’s ability 
to “create” wins is paramount. For the ease of modeling, this study assumes that fans’ affinities 
for certain players do not motivate playing decisions. 
Furthermore, established sports economic theory suggests that the uncertainty of 
outcomes drives popularity (Keohane and Shmanske, 2012). As professional basketball has long 
experienced the lowest competitive balance of the four major North American leagues, the NBA 
has an incentive to promote team equality (Vrooman, 1995). Used in every major North 
American sports league, the reverse-order player draft is perhaps the most notable tool to 
increase competitive balance. Over the past 30 years, the league has instituted additional 
restrictions to increase its competitive balance, most notably a “soft” team salary cap in 1984. 
Overall, however, NBA salaries were governed by a loose set of restrictions prior to the 1995 
CBA (Hill and Jolly, 2012).  
In 1995 the NBA and the Player’s Association instituted rookie scale contracts, providing 
guaranteed money in the first three years to all first round picks. Prior to the agreement, second 
round picks often were given the league minimum salaries, and this remained true under the 
1995 CBA (Hill and Jolly, 2012). The 1999 CBA established a maximum salary for veteran 
players and granted a team option for the fourth year of a rookie contract. Though this CBA kept 
the rookie contract salary cap exemption, the scale amounts were lowered. In 2005 rookie 
contracts were shortened to two guaranteed years with a team option in both the third and fourth 
years. Though the 2011 CBA maintained rookie contracts in their 2005 form, CBAs have 
consistently lowered the costs of retaining young players perhaps motivated by their risky and 
unproven nature.  
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Hill and Groothius (2001) use the Median Voter Theorem to explain why individual 
salary caps were instituted in 1999. As top draft picks were often paid exorbitant amounts, this 
Theorem could be applied to explain why the Union initially approved of rookie scale contracts. 
Hill and Jolly (2012) attribute both the 1995 introduction of rookie contracts and the 1999 
extension from three to four years to corresponding decreases in salary inequality. In particular, 
they found a significant economic rent shift from superstar rookies to veterans. Since rookies 
have become relatively cheaper and their associated sunk costs have become lesser in magnitude, 
theory predicts a decrease in escalation of commitment. 
Given the draft’s importance to improvement, teams have clear incentives to draft the 
best players and the ones most likely to produce wins. However, studies have concluded that 
professional sports teams are far from perfect at evaluating talent. Studying all major 
professional sports, Koz, Fraser-Thomas, and Baker (2011) found that draft position is a 
significant predictor of playing time but not a great predictor of performance. In the National 
Football League (NFL), Berri and Simmons (2011) concluded that teams are not very good at 
predicting quarterback performance. On the contrary, Boulier, Stekler, Coburn, and Rankins 
(2010) found that NFL teams are relatively successful at evaluating the future success of 
quarterbacks.  
In the NBA, Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) found overall inefficiency in the draft and that 
teams consider factors proven to be irrelevant to NBA production. In particular, collegiate 
scoring is among the most significant determinants of draft position. Also, players on Final Four 
teams saw their draft position jump by twelve spots on average. However, if players stayed in 
college for an additional year after reaching the Final Four, this effect dissipated. Furthermore, 
while a premium is placed on bigger players, shooting guards were taken lower and each year of 
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aging led to a decline of six draft spots. For the sake of this study, it is important to understand 
that the market of NBA entrants may be inefficient. This inefficiency requires teams to re-
evaluate their picks and continuously update their performance expectations, which provides the 
opportunity for escalation.  
C. Previous Studies 
Staw and Hoang (1995) conducted the initial research on the escalation of commitment in 
the NBA using data from the first five years of the players taken in the 1980-86 drafts. Using 
generic performance indexes and controlling for position, injury and trade, they found that draft 
position was a significant predictor of playing time in each of the first four years of players’ 
careers. In addition, through an event history analysis, they found that draft position was a highly 
significant predictor of career longevity. 
 Camerer and Weber (1998) modified Staw and Hoang’s models. First, to account for 
team environments they used backup player performance, instead of simply team winning 
percentage. If a pick’s backup is unsatisfactory, then a team may have no other option but to play 
the draft pick. Second, recognizing that draft position may provide inherent expectations of a 
player’s future productivity, they controlled with a third party pre-draft ranking. Third, to 
account for differences in costs between rounds, they controlled for the absence of guaranteed 
money in second round picks. Because second round picks are often paid less and given 
unguaranteed contracts, their incurred costs differ from the set guaranteed amounts of first 
rounders. Fourth, they included a pick-trade interaction variable. They asserted that if a player’s 
draft position is no longer predictive after a trade then escalation by the prior team potentially 
occurred. As noted in the study, this premise requires evidence of de-escalation as evidence of 
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prior escalation. Lastly, in addition to lagged performance variables, they also used 
contemporaneous and decomposed performance indices. Contrary to their hypothesis, evidence 
of escalation persisted. In fact, they found draft position to be a significant predictor through the 
first three years, only one year less than discovered by Staw and Hoang. 
D. Advanced Performance Metrics 
Both of these studies used three-category performance indices: “scoring”, “toughness” 
and “quickness.” From a basketball perspective, the comprehensive statistics employed in this 
study are well-regarded tools to evaluate performance. The first statistic used in this study is 
John Hollinger’s Player Efficiency Rating (PER). Using linear weights, this statistic utilizes the 
entire box score to evaluate a player’s ability on a per minute basis. Though PER incorporates 
positive and negative characteristics and controls for game environment, Berri and Bradbury 
(2010) note that it is not highly correlated with wins. Therefore this study also considers a 
second metric, the Win Shares statistic (WS). This metric measures a player’s marginal win 
product. Using both team and individual performance, the WS statistic computes a player’s 
addition to wins. As this study is conducted under the assumption that teams seek wins under a 
profit-maximizing environment, tying performance statistics to win production is a critical 
improvement. The computations of both statistics are available in Appendix A. 
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III. Econometric Model 
In their study, Staw and Hoang (1995) proposed a simple multivariate model to estimate 
minutes played per season on a year-to-year basis (t= time in years). However, to account for the 
2011 shortened season, the dependent variable was switched to minutes played per game. This 
model was employed to compare the data between the studies: 
(5)                                                                       
 
Min= minutes played per game 
S= Scoring 
T= Toughness 
Q= Quickness 
Inj= injury 
Tr= trade  
Win= team winning percentage 
D= draft number 
Pos= guard or forward/center 
Camerer and Weber (1999) modified this regression: 
(6)                                                                 
X= vector of variables used in Model 
(1) 
BS, BT, BQ= back-up player 
performance indices 
B= belief, or third-party pre-draft evaluation of 
player’s ability 
R= draft round 
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In this study, the multivariate model is based off equation (6) and equation (7): 
(7)                                                     
 
P= vector of lagged and contemporaneous performance measures (PER/WS) 
T= vector of team performance measures (win percentage, offensive efficiency and defensive efficiency) 
I= injury 
C= head coach or general manager firing 
B= third-party pre-draft evaluation 
In this model a dummy variable for a head coach or general manager firing is included to 
address a potential reputational concern. If the predictive value of draft position diminishes after 
a coach or GM change then reputational “costs” could have motivated a player’s playing time or 
survival on a team.  
Though Staw and Hoang (1995) used an event history analysis, such an analysis is 
invalid. A fundamental assumption of this study is that draft pick is a proxy for a player’s salary. 
As ensuing contracts are not necessarily related to draft position, this assumption is invalidated 
once the initial contract expires or is terminated. Even more troublesome, the same expectations 
that motivated a player’s initial draft position may rationally motivate an ensuing contract given 
that the contracts, i.e. sunk costs, are indeterminate and may incur little commitment. Therefore, 
analyzing the effect of pick on survival can be misleading.  
Instead of an event history analysis a logistic regression is used to analyze decision 
making on a year-to-year basis. Also, with consideration of the relevant CBA, this model 
evaluates how rookie scale contracts affect a team’s decision to retain a player. The model is as 
follows: 
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(8)                            
Ret= whether a team elects to retain a player 
Z= vector of player and team factors in Model 3 without Injury and Trade 
Considering the aforementioned lockstep relationship between pick and salary for first 
round picks, Models (7) and (8) will consider both a sample limited to first round picks and a 
pooled sample. Furthermore, the first round sample will be separated by CBA to determine if the 
change in rookie contracts affected teams’ behavior. Lastly, draft position will be removed from 
the equation to evaluate the sole effect of round. Though there is a lockstep salary structure for 
first round picks, the differences in amounts are not only relatively minor but exempt from the 
salary cap. Thus all first round picks may effectively incur equal commitment to teams. 
Therefore, pick is removed from the model to evaluate round’s sole effect on retainment. 
IV. Data 
 All of the individual and team data were obtained from www.basketball-reference.com 
with the exception of injury data which were extracted from www.prosportstransactions.com.  
The data consist of all players from the 1999-2008 draft classes. Variable definitions and 
descriptive statistics are available in Appendix B. 
V. Results & Discussion 
 This study hypothesized that there would be no evidence of escalation with respect to 
playing time. Furthermore, pick would have no effect on a player’s odds of retainment. To begin 
the study the data were analyzed using the same model as Staw and Hoang (1995). Pick was 
highly significant through Year 3 (p-value<.001) and remained significant (p-value<.05) through 
the sixth year. Among the control variables, trade and injury were significant through all six 
years. Scoring and quickness also were significant predictors of playing time. These results were 
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quite similar to those found by Staw and Hoang. With R-squared values between .39 and .51, this 
model proved to be a slightly better fit than with Staw and Hoang whose R-squared values never 
exceeded .46. 
Table 1: Staw and Hoang model with Performance Indexes1 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
 
As seen in Table 2, when the performance indexes were replaced with the advanced 
metric Win Shares, the model performed slightly worse. Compared to the Table 1 results, pick 
was greater in magnitude and was more significant in the later years. Injury, trade and team 
                                                          
1
 The regressions begin with Year 2 because of the lagged performance variable. Also, as the 2013-2014 season 
marks the sixth year for the 2008 class, these players were excluded from all of the Year 6 regressions. 
Minutes per 
game 
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
      Scoring 2.647*** 4.000*** 3.551*** 1.513*** 3.086*** 
 
(.4614) (.5346) (.5911) (.5304) (.6072) 
Toughness 0.336 1.240* 1.326 1.043 2.434** 
 
(.6262) (.7163) (.8369) (.7738) (.9911) 
Quickness 1.745*** 2.750*** 2.010*** 1.651*** 2.849*** 
 
(.4989) (.5359) (.5776) (.6369) (.6393) 
Injury -8.196*** -9.127*** -7.606*** -11.272*** -7.526*** 
 
(.8854) (.9198) (.9818) (1.0825) (1.1240) 
Trade -4.502*** -4.620*** -4.698*** -5.854*** -2.888** 
 
(1.1057) (.9477) (.9861) (1.0971) (1.2248) 
Position -1.145 -0.970 -2.619* -3.291** -1.98 
 
(1.2608) (1.4270) (1.5515) (1.6361) (1.7288) 
Team Success -8.746*** -4.397 -1.045 -7.021** -2.196 
 
(3.0232) (3.0897) (3.2922) (3.4016) (3.6456) 
Pick -0.251*** -0.169*** -0.071** -0.077** -0.079** 
 
(.0307) (.0324) (.0352) (.0347) (.0373) 
Constant 29.200*** 28.853*** 27.215*** 34.706*** 29.019*** 
 
(1.6377) (1.8347) (2.0777) (2.3526) (2.4478) 
N 378 350 311 280 236 
R-squared 0.4752 0.5117 0.3963 0.4437 0.3866 
Adj. R-squared 0.4638 0.5003 0.3803 0.4273 0.365 
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success had similar effects. Interestingly, unlike the initial model, position had a highly 
significant negative coefficient, suggesting that guards experienced more playing time. In the 
initial model toughness accounted for forward/center qualities (rebounds and blocks) and 
quickness consisted of guard statistics (assists and steals). These performance indexes could have 
absorbed the explanatory power provided by position in the Win Shares model. As seen in Table 
3, when the linear-weighted PER metric was used, pick was highly significant through Year 3, 
and was significant at the 5% level in Year 4.  
Table 2: Staw and Hoang model with Win Shares 
Minutes per 
game 
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
  
    
  
Win Shares 41.489*** 31.134*** 43.640*** 11.074** 57.275*** 
  (5.8217) (4.9680) (7.2690) (4.8550) (10.7080) 
Injury -8.147*** -9.015*** -7.710*** -11.335*** -7.529*** 
  (.8763) (.9630) (.9940) (1.0920) (1.1660) 
Trade -2.985** -5.264*** -4.429*** -6.661*** -3.669*** 
  (1.1267) (.9880) (1.0210) (1.0820) (1.2450) 
Position -4.238*** -3.727*** -4.351*** -4.107*** -3.404*** 
  (.8963) (.9480) (.9720) (.9870) (1.1060) 
Team Success -9.890*** -3.406 -3.364 -8.603** -5.892 
  (2.9857) (3.2200) (3.4000) (3.4030) (3.8610) 
Pick -0.2801*** -0.219*** -0.124*** -0.096*** -0.091** 
  (.0299) (.0340) (.0350) (.0350) (.0380) 
Constant 29.515*** 28.982*** 26.789*** 35.903*** 26.447*** 
  (1.6019) (1.9090) (2.0750) (2.2520) (2.6520) 
N 378 350 311 280 236 
R-squared 0.4816 0.4586 0.3719 0.4215 0.3371 
Adj. R-squared 0.4733 0.4491 0.3595 0.4088 0.3197 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
 
Altogether, substituting advanced performance metrics into the Staw and Hoang model 
did not drastically change the results. The results from the PER model deviated from the 
previous studies as pick’s level of significance diminished after Year 3. However, pick remained 
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significant through Year 5. Moreover, the adjusted R-squared values were consistently higher for 
the PER model. To limit redundancy in the other models, PER was the only performance statistic 
used going forward. 
Table 3: Staw and Hoang model with PER 
Minutes per 
game 
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
  
    
  
PER 0.801*** 1.018*** 0.899*** 0.643*** 1.052*** 
 
(0.1015) (0.1111) (0.1173) (0.1185) (0.1301) 
Injury -7.831*** -8.642*** -7.168*** -11.141*** -7.119*** 
  (.8680) (.9135) (.9643) (1.0462) (1.0923) 
Trade -3.642*** -4.329*** -3.895*** -4.942*** -2.127 
  (1.0912) (.9460) (.9928) (1.0939) (1.1953) 
Position -3.926*** -4.074*** -4.588*** -4.285*** -3.178*** 
  (.8714) -(.8982) -(.9398) -(.9472) (1.0237) 
Team Success -7.669*** -3.428 -1.486 -7.517** 2.479 
  (2.9369) (3.0466) (3.2403) (3.2649) (3.5302) 
Pick -0.245*** -0.168*** -0.069** -0.066* -0.051 
  (.0300) (.0321) (.0345) (.0340) (.0362) 
Constant 20.304*** 16.517*** 15.435*** 25.095*** 12.692 
  (2.0551) (2.3964) (2.6774) (3.0417) (3.2957) 
N 378 350 311 280 236 
R-squared 0.4953 0.5153 0.4113 0.4679 0.4198 
Adj. R-squared 0.4872 0.5068 0.3997 0.4562 0.4046 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
 
After using the Staw and Hoang model, the study switched to the modified model in 
Equation (7). As seen in Table 4, pick remained significant in Years 2 and 3 and was significant 
at the 10% level in Year 5. However, the controls for reputational costs, informational value and 
contract differences between rounds resulted in slightly smaller pick coefficients. As for the 
additional controls, round was only significant in Year 3 while belief was significant in Years 2, 
3 and 6. Both of these findings are contrary to Camerer and Weber (1999) who found that belief 
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and round were irrelevant. Given that their sample was prior to the institution of the Rookie 
Scale contract, round may have become important once first round picks were mandated 
guaranteed money. The reputation coefficient was positively significant in Year 6 and 
insignificant in all other years. The positive relationship, which suggests that a coach or 
executive change increases playing time, was contrary to expectations. Compared to the previous 
model, the adjusted R-squared values were higher in all years, except in Year 4 when it was 
slightly lower. 
Team decision makers undoubtedly continuously update their expectations of players. To 
account for this reality, controls for lagged and contemporaneous performance were added to the 
model. As displayed in Table 5, pick was significant only in Year 2. Contemporaneous PER was 
significant in all years, but lagged PER was largely insignificant after Year 3, possibly due to 
multicollinearity. As the adjusted R-squared values were higher than in the other regressions, the 
lagged and contemporaneous measures provided explanatory power.  
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Table 4: Modified model controlling for reputation concerns, informational content and first-round guaranteed money 
Minutes per 
game 
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
  
    
  
PER 0.7475*** 0.9309*** 0.8994*** 0.6229*** 1.0282*** 
  (.1012) (.1129) (.1191) (.1194) (.1272) 
Injury -7.4227*** -8.7761*** -7.2322*** -11.2825*** -6.8312*** 
  (.8606) (.9079) (.9714) (1.0483) (1.0704) 
Trade -3.9637*** -4.8344*** -3.8875*** -4.7946*** -1.7670 
  (1.0829) (.9451) (1.0015) (1.0923) (1.1649) 
Position -4.2639*** -4.2835*** -4.6269*** -4.3505*** -3.2357*** 
  (.8693) (.8941) (.9583) (.9501) (1.0014) 
Team Winning -36.1397*** -11.4161 -2.0082 -19.4236 14.2697 
  (12.1019) (12.7941) (13.0145) (12.7796) (14.2971) 
Team Offense 0.9323** 0.3510 -0.0571 0.4719 -0.3939 
  (.3863) (.4193) (.4196) (.4143) (.4595) 
Team Defense -0.9797** -0.1739 -0.1387 -0.3703 0.5487 
  (.3921) (.4054) (.4161) (.4111) (.4474) 
Round -3.2143** -3.6619** 0.7769 -3.0259 -1.6937 
  (1.6161) (1.7330) (1.8111) (1.9094) (1.9325) 
Belief -0.1294*** -0.1225*** -0.0061 0.0114 -0.1657*** 
  (.0416) (.0446) (.0480) (.0497) (.0528) 
Reputation 0.0195 -0.3016 0.6932 2.1472 3.6653** 
  (.8520) (.9337) (1.0052) (1.3609) (1.5627) 
Pick -0.2126*** -0.1444** -0.0367 -0.1484* 0.0842 
  (.0645) (.0690) (.0745) (.0771) (.0780) 
Constant 44.9137*** 8.4366 34.9513* 22.3485 -13.1957 
  (17.0910) (17.3502) (20.7182) (20.7320) (25.5668) 
N 378 350 311 280 236 
R-squared 0.5185 0.5339 0.4149 0.4813 0.4671 
Adj. R-squared 0.5041 0.5187 0.3934 0.4600 0.4409 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
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Table 5: Modified model with lagged and contemporaneous performance 
Minutes 
per game 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
  
 
    
  
PER Year 1 0.6703*** 0.4897*** 0.1621 0.0169 0.3554** 0.2075 
  (.0775) (.1049) (.1245) (.1478) (.1532) (.1586) 
PER Year 2 
 
0.5725*** 0.2271* 0.1885 -0.0194 0.1086 
  
 
(.0920) (.1251) (.1739) (.1863) (.2066) 
PER Year 3 
 
 
1.0637*** 0.244 0.0379 -0.077 
  
 
 
(.1118) (.1726) (.1961) (.2143) 
PER Year 4 
 
  
0.7109*** 0.1599 0.1898 
  
 
  
(.1401) (.1662) (.1862) 
PER Year 5 
 
   
0.5623*** 0.1541 
  
 
   
(.1419) (.2046) 
PER Year 6 
 
    
0.8576*** 
  
 
    
(.1872) 
Injury -5.2795*** -7.1267*** -7.3975*** -6.6431*** -11.0290*** -6.8336*** 
  (.6680) (.8208) (.8310) (.9717) (1.0599) (1.0462) 
Trade -0.9164 -3.3763*** -3.6666*** -3.5822*** -3.9342*** -0.4593 
  (1.7531) (1.0354) (.8626) (.9774) (1.0812) (1.1562) 
Position -2.6198*** -4.5536*** -6.0686*** -5.3035*** -5.8455*** -2.9410*** 
  (.7036) (.8290) (.8142) (.9511) (.9594) (1.0500) 
Team 
Success 
-6.0603 -32.9696*** -7.3887 -1.9629 -24.6716* 20.1674 
  (9.6609) (11.5341) (11.5175) (12.7943) (13.4615) (14.4175) 
Team 
Offense 
-0.4242 0.7634** -0.0337 -0.0165 0.5898 -0.6274 
  (.3042) (.3688) (.3756) (.4141) (.4385) (.4600) 
Team 
Defense 
0.2054 -0.8583** -0.1222 -0.1083 -0.4487 0.766* 
  (.3076) (.3738) (.3643) (.4070) (.4286) (.4487) 
Round -1.7802 -2.3443 -2.7165* 0.4532 -4.0676** -1.1349 
  (1.2678) (1.5451) (1.5457) (1.8494) (1.9267) (1.9916) 
Belief -0.0979*** -0.1075*** -0.0902** 0.0265 -0.015 -0.0959 
  (.0315) (.0398) (.0404) (.0503) (.0509) (.0557) 
Reputation -0.5539 -0.1133 -0.3627 0.7988 1.748 2.8731 
  (.8848) (.8115) (.8399) (1.0088) (1.4022) (1.7790) 
Pick -0.1911*** -0.1931*** -0.0744 -0.0574 -0.1158 0.0302 
  (.0487) (.0615) (.0622) (.0762) (.0778) (.0800) 
Constant 40.6754*** 42.347** 31.5023* 23.5446 15.5089 -20.6921 
  (13.3123) (16.2784) (16.0177) (20.4796) (20.7840) (25.2034) 
N 430 378 329 280 245 203 
R-squared 0.5677 0.5647 0.6566 0.4848 0.5757 0.5797 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.5564 0.5504 0.6424 0.4576 0.5479 0.5436 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
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As previously discussed, due to rookie scale contracts, pick is only a perfect proxy for 
salary during the first four years among first round picks. Therefore, the sample was limited only 
to first rounders. As seen in Table 6, pick was insignificant after Year 2. Contemporaneous PER 
was generally significant but the effects of lagged PER were mostly indeterminate. In Year 2 and 
Year 4 the adjusted R-squared values were higher than with all players while it was slightly 
lower in Year 3. Altogether, the additional controls and cumulative performance measures led to 
decreased evidence of escalation. In fact there was little evidence to suggest escalation past Year 
2. However, limiting the sample to first round picks did not drastically change the results. 
Switching to the logistic model to evaluate player retainment resulted in largely 
indeterminate effects of pick. With the exception of Year 3 under the 1999 CBA where it was 
significant at the 10% level, pick was insignificant. As seen in Table 7, the sample was split by 
CBA to determine if the decrease in commitment to first rounders from three years in the 1999 
CBA to two years in the 2005 CBA affected teams’ decisions. Similar to the multivariate 
regression, contemporaneous performance affected playing time but prior performance was not 
significant. Contrary to expectations, reputation was positively significant in Years 2 and 3 
under the 2005 CBA and in Year 4 under the 1999 CBA, suggesting that a decision maker 
change led to an increased chance of retainment. The pseudo R-squared values were consistently 
higher for the 1999 CBA but never exceeded .25.  
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Table 6: Multivariate model only with first round picks 
Minutes per 
game 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
  
 
  
  
PER Year 1 0.8157*** 0.3608*** 0.2061 -0.0532 
  (.1036) (.1337) (.1572) (.1740) 
PER Year 2 0.9688*** 0.2008 0.2407 
  
 
(.1322) (.1649) (.2098) 
PER Year 3 
 
0.9912*** -0.0518 
  
 
 
(.1409) (.2055) 
PER Year 4 
  
1.0441*** 
  
 
  
(.1878) 
Injury -5.8703*** -8.1109*** -8.3712*** -6.6449*** 
  (.8905) (.9349) (1.0094) (1.0669) 
Trade 2.0854 -2.3973 -4.6787*** -2.7145** 
  (3.0357) (1.3380) (1.0384) (1.1179) 
Position -3.6230*** -5.3995*** -5.3399*** -4.6777*** 
  (.8698) (.9438) (.9753) (1.0579) 
Team Success -2.903 -31.9135** -8.0438 0.3216 
  (12.7127) (13.1928) (13.3256) (14.2115) 
Team Offense -0.6906* 0.6866 0.0488 0.0246 
  (.4036) (.4204) (.4424) (.4599) 
Team Defense 0.2719 -0.8678** -0.1328 0.0022 
  (.4075) (.4306) (.4283) (.4556) 
Belief -0.1377** -0.1381** -0.1191* 0.1228 
  (.0544) (.0574) (.0620) (.0772) 
Reputation -0.1537 -0.2205 -0.3127 1.7815 
  (1.1798) (.9097) (1.0083) (1.1375) 
CBA 1.3299 -0.278 0.3578 -1.3255 
  (.9972) (1.0617) (1.1343) (1.1178) 
Pick -0.2181*** -0.1856** -0.0501 -0.1667 
  (.0804) (.0831) (.0888) (.1080) 
Constant 57.5421*** 46.0196** 22.6661 5.5795 
  (19.6414) (21.3058) (22.6740) (23.2563) 
N 271 263 242 215 
R-squared 0.5978 0.6288 0.6524 0.5203 
Adj. R-squared 0.5807 0.611 0.6325 0.4867 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
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Table 7: Logistic model separated by CBA 
Retained by 
draft team 
Year 2 
  
Year 3 
  
Year 4 
  
  1999 CBA    2005 CBA    1999 CBA     2005 CBA 1999 CBA 2005 CBA 
  
     
  
PER Year 1 0.1429*** 0.0495 0.0561 0.0658 0.0715 -0.0217 
  (.0433) (.0427) (.0510) (.0465) (.0543) (.0691) 
PER Year 2 
  
0.2082*** 0.0428 0.0506 0.1228 
  
  
(.0516) (.0370) (.0582) (.0750) 
PER Year 3 
    
0.2001*** 0.0778 
  
    
(.0574) (.0728) 
Position 0.8626** 0.5984 0.4145 0.5498 0.0747 -0.2048 
  (.3912) (.4586) (.3579) (.3847) (.3688) (.4582) 
Team 
Success 
-3.0100 -3.7212 -1.5216 4.3249 5.0906 -0.9894 
  (5.5982) (5.2579) (4.7362) (5.6058) (5.0555) (6.2091) 
Team 
Offense 
0.1194 0.0653 0.1206 -0.0680 -0.1402 0.1064 
  (.1785) (.1648) (.1543) (.1746) (.1625) (.2037) 
Team 
Defense 
-0.2135 -0.1739 -0.1076 0.0283 0.0861 -0.2239 
  (.1851) (.1692) (.1526) (.1891) (.1541) (.1998) 
Round 1.1696* 0.6390 1.7648** -0.2138 0.9766* -1.4463 
  (.6482) (.7347) (.6968) (.7076) (.7165) (.8610) 
Belief 0.0163 -0.0184 0.0606*** -0.0084 0.0252 -0.0119 
  (.0148) (.0176) (.0187) (.0196) (.0181) (.0240) 
Reputation 0.2915 0.9707** -0.1953 0.9466** 0.1778* 0.9501* 
  (.3453) (.4542) (.3506) (.4013) (.3664) (.5374) 
Pick -0.0344 -0.0128 -0.0533* -0.0345 -0.0211 -0.05 
  (.0238) (.0278) (.0275) (.0298) (.0287) (.0358) 
Constant 10.2734 14.0127 -5.1622 1.3391 -2.4036 12.1265 
  (7.7964) (10.7675) (6.9002) (11.2719) (7.5709) (12.7470) 
N 248 182 219 159 193 136 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.2196 0.1926 0.2482 0.1444 0.2273 0.1842 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
 
As seen in Table 8, the CBA samples were pooled together and the sample was limited to 
first round picks. With this limitation, the model was only significant at the 10% level in Year 2 
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(prob>chi2=.0835) but was highly significant thereafter. However, the pseudo R-squared values 
were lower than when both rounds were included. Pick was significant at the 10% level in Year 
3, but there was no significant effect of CBA. Altogether, pick’s reduced significance and lack of 
significance past Year 2 in the multivariate regression (Table 6) suggest little escalation among 
first round players.  
Table 8: Logistic model with only first round picks 
Retained by draft 
team Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
  
  
  
PER Year 1 0.1376*** 0.0409 0.0347 
  (.0452) (.0435) (.0505) 
PER Year 2 
 
0.1783*** 0.1027* 
  
 
(.0461) (.0554) 
PER Year 3 
  
0.1543*** 
  
  
(.0515) 
Position -0.0330 0.1213 -0.2422 
  (.3840) (.3133) (.3173) 
Team Success -1.1186 -1.9843 4.0425 
  (5.5147) (4.2822) (4.2299) 
Team Offense 0.0685 0.1086 -0.1329 
  (.1761) (.1380) (.1377) 
Team Defense -0.0484 -0.1400 0.0721 
  (.1794) (.1382) (.1346) 
Belief 0.0094 0.0304 0.0128 
  (.0231) (.0192) (.0195) 
Reputation 0.5951 0.6573** 0.4503 
  (.3763) (.3056) (.3287) 
Pick -0.0721 -0.2407* -0.3523 
  (.4269) (.3480) (.3726) 
CBA -0.0244 -0.0473 -0.0299 
  (.0334) (.0275) (.0286) 
Constant -1.3154 1.981 0.4375 
  (8.3425) (6.8956) (7.4621) 
N 271 263  242 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0674 0.1489  .1786 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
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As mentioned earlier, rookie scale contracts are not only a relatively small part of a 
team’s payroll, but they are also exempt from the salary cap. Therefore, it is possible that the 
differences in first round salaries are relatively minor, and thus commitment among all first 
round players is effectively equal. If this is assumed true, escalation could still exist if round 
affects retainment. As seen in Table 9, when pick was removed, round was significant in all 
years under the 1999 CBA but was never significant under the 2005 CBA. These results suggest 
that being drafted in the first round affected chances of survival under the 1999 CBA but did not 
affect odds of retainment under the 2005 CBA. As previously mentioned, the 1999 CBA 
guaranteed three year contracts to first rounders while the 2005 CBA guaranteed two years. The 
results indicate that first round picks under the 1999 CBA were more likely than second round 
players to be retained through their guaranteed years. Furthermore, first round picks also were 
more likely to be retained for their optional fourth year. However, since there was no 
proportionate decrease in escalation under the 2005 CBA, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the change in the CBA affected the retainment of first round players. 
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Table 9: Logistic model without Pick variable separated by CBA 
Retained by 
draft team 
Year 2 
  
Year 3 
  
Year 4 
  
  
          1999 CBA       2005 CBA 
    1999 
CBA 
 2005 
CBA 
 1999 
CBA 
2005 
CBA 
  
     
  
PER Year 1 0.1431*** 0.0502 0.0615 0.0678 0.071 -0.0252 
  (.0430) (.0427) (.0509) (.0463) (.0544) (.0690) 
PER Year 2 
  
0.2046*** 0.0471 0.0475 0.1153 
  
  
(.0514) (.0368) (.0580) (.0744) 
PER Year 3 
    
0.2060*** 0.097 
  
    
(.0570) (.0710) 
Position 0.8506** 0.6376 0.3985 0.6289* 0.0539 -0.1086 
  (.3897) (.4517) (.3546) (.3783) (.3670) (.4450) 
Team Success -3.8032 -3.8498 -2.2913 4.8546 5.1827 -1.8596 
  (5.5113) (5.2565) (4.6867) (5.4928) (5.0434) (6.1371) 
Team Offense 0.1322 0.0613 0.1307 -0.0944 -0.1477 0.1278 
  (.1765) (.1643) (.1528) (.1708) (.1618) (.2014) 
Team Defense -0.23 -0.1783 -0.1095 0.0401 0.0894 -0.2381 
  (.1828) (.1691) (.1522) (.1861) (.1538) (.1996) 
Belief 0.0074 -0.0225 0.0413*** -0.0229 0.0173 -0.0338* 
  (.0133) (.0152) (.0150) (.0152) (.0145) (.0185) 
Reputation 0.2403 0.9441** -0.2106 0.9187** 0.1486 0.8449 
  (.3402) (.4497) (.3489) (.3977) (.3642) (.5261) 
Round 1.8244*** 0.8689 2.6018*** 0.3299 1.2988** -0.5988 
  (.4755) (.5411) (.5586) (.5328) (.5714) (.6040) 
Constant 10.047 14.6021 -6.9408 1.7236 -2.522 10.4605 
  (7.7380) (10.7062) (6.8314) (11.1930) (7.5800) (12.6076) 
N 248 182 219 159 193 136 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.2125 0.1916 0.2353 0.1383 0.2252 0.1732 
Note: *** denotes p-value<.01;** <.05; and * <.1. Standard errors are in parentheses and trade is a two-side test. 
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VI. Conclusion 
By incorporating recent theoretical literature and considering the current NBA labor 
environment, this study predicted that there would be evidence of little, if any, escalation of 
commitment. Furthermore, it sought to improve the data sample by limiting it to observations 
where draft position was predictably related to salary, i.e. “commitment.” Rejecting the 
suitability of an event history analysis, this study employed a logistic model designed to offer 
insight not provided by the previous studies. The study predicted that while draft pick may lead 
to increased playing time, escalation would not exist if draft position did not affect teams’ 
decisions to retain their young players. If this hypothesis proved correct, escalation of 
commitment would be rejected. 
In this study cumulative performance measures and additional controls not only provided 
more predictive power of playing time and retainment but also reduced pick’s effects. However, 
a coach or GM change did not lead to less escalation and thus there was no evidence of 
reputational concerns. In fact, on many occurrences there was evidence that an executive change 
positively affected a player’s odds of survival and playing time. In accordance with expectations, 
when the sample was limited to the first round, pick lost much of its predictive value which 
suggests that team behavior is similar among first round players. In the multivariate model there 
was a significant effect only in Year 2 and only at the 5% level. Furthermore, the logistic model 
provided no direct relationship between pick and probability of retainment. However, under the 
1999 CBA guaranteed money increased not only the likelihood of retainment during the 
guaranteed years but also increased the likelihood of offering a team option in Year 4. Under the 
2005 CBA no such effects were found. 
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Appendix A 
1. The Player Efficiency Rating is calculated as follows: 
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MP=minutes played  
FGA=field goal attempts  
FG=field goals made 
3P=three point FG made 
AST=assists  
FT=free throws made  
TOV=turnovers  
DRB%=defensive rebounding percentage 
STL=steals  
BLK=blocks  
ORB=offensive rebound
 
The unadjusted PER (uPER) is then standardized to the league pace and the league average: 
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2. The Win Shares metric is calculated as follows: 
Marginal offense is computed: 
                                            
Then, the marginal points per win (MPW) is calculated: 
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) 
Then Win Shares is computed as follows,  
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Appendix B 
1. 
Table 1a: Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
Minutes per Game Minutes played per game 
 
Retained by Draft Team 
 
If a player is retained by his drafted team for the entirety of the year then the 
variable is equal to 1, and equal to 0 if not. 
Scoring 
 
 
Toughness 
 
 
Quickness 
 
 
PER 
 
Win Shares 
 
Pick 
Standardized performance index consisting of points per minute, field-goal 
percentage and free-throw percentage 
 
Standardized performance index consisting of rebounds per minute and 
blocks per minute 
 
Standardized performance index consisting of assists per minute and steals 
per minute 
 
Player Efficiency Rating 
 
Win Shares per 48 minutes 
 
Player’s draft position expressed as the draft number. 
 
Round 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if drafted in the first round and equal to 0 if 
drafted in the second round. 
 
Belief 
 
Average of the third-party draft projections of www.nbadraft.net and ESPN 
draft analyst Chad Ford, both reputable experts in player evaluation. 
 
Injury 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a player missed more than 10 games during 
the season and equal to 0 if not. 
 
Trade Dummy variable equal to 1 if traded or cut before or during the season and 
equal to 0 if not. 
 
Position Dummy variable equal to 1 if a player is a Power Forward or Center and 
equal to 0 if not. 
 
Team Success 
 
Team winning percentage, inputted as a decimal. 
 
Team Offense 
 
Points produced per 100 possessions 
Team Defense 
 
 
 
Points allowed per 100 possessions 
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2. 
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pick 587 29.8620 16.9780 1.0000 60.0000 
Belief 587 32.2010 19.5459 1.0000 61.0000 
Round 587 0.4974 0.5004 0.0000 1.0000 
Position 587 0.2675 0.4430 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 1 
     Minutes per game 430 11.0642 9.8209 0.0366 38.0732 
Scoring 430 0.0000 1.0000 -3.4842 3.4894 
Toughness 430 0.0000 1.0000 -2.1940 2.9082 
Quickness 430 0.0000 1.0000 -1.6132 3.5699 
PER 430 10.9823 4.9157 -20.4000 26.0000 
Win Shares 430 0.0384 0.0827 -0.3710 0.3450 
Trade 430 0.0256 0.1579 0.0000 1.0000 
Injury 430 0.3066 0.4615 0.0000 1.0000 
Team Success 430 0.4613 0.1508 0.1585 0.8171 
Team Offense 430 104.6550 3.7886 92.2000 113.9000 
Team Defense 430 105.8470 3.4781 95.4000 114.7000 
Reputation 430 0.1329 0.3397 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 2 
     Minutes per game 408 14.9629 11.0349 0.0122 41.3171 
Retained by Draft team 408 0.7428 0.4375 0.0000 1.0000 
Scoring 408 0.0000 1.0000 -4.6811 6.3793 
Toughness 408 0.0000 1.0000 -2.2448 2.7208 
Quickness 408 0.0000 1.0000 -1.6694 5.1444 
PER 408 12.2909 6.5227 -48.6000 53.0000 
Win Shares 408 0.0645 0.1214 -1.2640 0.7100 
Trade 408 0.2641 0.4412 0.0000 1.0000 
Injury 408 0.2470 0.4316 0.0000 1.0000 
Team Success 408 0.4705 0.1413 0.1463 0.8049 
Team Offense 408 105.1951 3.6933 92.2000 115.3000 
Team Defense 408 106.1066 3.5041 95.4000 114.7000 
Reputation 408 0.3407 0.4744 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 3 
     Minutes per game 378 17.0086 11.6729 0.1098 40.9878 
Retained by Draft team 378 0.5281 0.4996 0.0000 1.0000 
Scoring 378 0.0000 1.0000 -4.7772 3.4567 
Toughness 378 0.0000 1.0000 -2.1236 3.9197 
Quickness 378 0.0000 1.0000 -1.6943 4.6050 
PER 378 13.2471 5.4148 -9.0000 35.3000 
Win Shares 378 0.0739 0.0878 -0.4500 0.3720 
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Table 2a (continued): Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trade 378 0.4770 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
Injury 378 0.2351 0.4244 0.0000 1.0000 
Team Success 378 0.4818 0.1439 0.1463 0.8171 
Team Offense 378 105.7622 3.5727 92.2000 115.3000 
Team Defense 378 106.2654 3.5609 94.1000 114.4000 
Reputation 378 0.4634 0.4991 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 4 
     Minutes per game 327 18.8302 10.5495 0.0366 41.1342 
Retained by Draft team 327 0.4055 0.4914 0.0000 1.0000 
Scoring 327 0.0000 1.0000 -5.2204 2.3003 
Toughness 327 0.0000 1.0000 -2.1655 3.8521 
Quickness 327 0.0000 1.0000 -1.6162 4.1431 
PER 327 14.1844 5.9642 -54.4000 33.3000 
Win Shares 327 0.0886 0.0991 -1.3120 0.2950 
Trade 327 0.5963 0.4911 0.0000 1.0000 
Injury 327 0.1925 0.3946 0.0000 1.0000 
Team Success 327 0.4894 0.1418 0.1061 0.8171 
Team Offense 327 105.9805 3.4517 95.2000 114.5000 
Team Defense 327 106.3539 3.3660 94.1000 114.7000 
Reputation 327 0.4600 0.4988 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 5 
     Minutes per game 299 20.0106 11.0884 0.0488 41.2683 
Retained by Draft team 299 0.3322 0.4714 0.0000 1.0000 
Scoring 299 0.0000 1.0000 -4.8258 4.1788 
Toughness 299 0.0000 1.0000 -2.0699 3.1860 
Quickness 299 0.0000 1.0000 -1.7246 4.1299 
PER 299 14.9268 4.5551 3.7000 35.2000 
Win Shares 299 0.1031 0.0622 -0.0860 0.4840 
Trade 299 0.6678 0.4714 0.0000 1.0000 
Injury 299 0.1465 0.3539 0.0000 1.0000 
Team Success 299 0.5058 0.1463 0.1585 0.8049 
Team Offense 299 106.4754 3.3931 99.0000 115.3000 
Team Defense 299 106.2148 3.5835 94.1000 114.7000 
Reputation 299 0.5860 0.4930 0.0000 1.0000 
Year 6 
     Minutes per game 249 20.5452 10.0556 0.0610 39.3537 
Retained by Draft team 249 0.2828 0.4507 0.0000 1.0000 
Scoring 249 0.0000 1.0000 -3.4585 2.5814 
Toughness 249 0.0000 1.0000 -2.2255 3.0159 
Quickness 249 0.0000 1.0000 -1.5703 4.5486 
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Table 2a (continued): Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PER 249 14.5438 4.9018 -4.8000 33.0000 
Win Shares 249 0.0956 0.0643 -0.1790 0.3180 
Trade 249 0.7019 0.4578 0.0000 1.0000 
Injury 249 0.1431 0.3505 0.0000 1.0000 
Team Success 249 0.4876 0.1497 0.1061 0.8171 
Team Offense 249 106.4357 3.2563 95.2000 114.5000 
Team Defense 249 106.9176 3.2529 98.2000 114.4000 
Reputation 249 0.6099 0.4882 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
